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Abstract 
This paper illustrates the importance of estimating risk preferences when evaluating 
water policy. Using agricultural production data from the Kiti region of Cyprus we estimate 
farmers’ risk preferences à la Antle (1983, 1987) and show sensitivity to higher order 
moments of profit, such as skewness. We show that farmers in the Kiti region are risk averse 
with risk premiums in the region of 20% of expected profit. We use these estimates to analyse 
the impact of a water quota from the perspective of three policy-makers who differ only in 
their understanding of farmers’ risk preferences. We show in the case of Kiti that policy-
makers who model risk preferences incorrectly, that is, either; a) assume risk neutrality or; b) 
ignore down-side risk, wrongly predict the magnitude and direction of input responses and 
therefore the magnitude of welfare changes. This highlights the importance of 
accommodating preferences for higher order moments of profit in the evaluation of water 
policy. 
 
Keywords: stochastic agricultural production, risk attitudes, conservation policy, moments-
based estimation. 
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The Story of the Moment: 
Risk Averse Cypriot Farmers Respond to Drought Management 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years much attention has been paid to the analysis of farmers’ responses to water 
conservation policies (e.g. Moore et al., 1994; Schaible, 1997; Iglesias et al., 2003). Naturally, 
irrigated agriculture has been the focus of much of this analysis due to the common 
perception of this sector as both ‘originator and victim’ of drought (Grigg, 1996, Iglesias et 
al., 2003). Several key dimensions of farmer responses to water conservation policies, such as 
water pricing or quantitative restrictions, have been studied empirically. For instance, the 
price elasticity of demand for irrigation water (e.g., Nieswiadomy, 1988); the effect of water 
price on irrigation development and irrigation technology choice, (e.g., Koundouri et al., 
2005); the effect of water restrictions and pricing on crop-choice, land allocation, and crop 
specific water demand (e.g., Moore et al., 1994, Moore and Negri, 1992). More recently, 
Schaible (1997) analysed farmers' responses to water conservation policies where 
groundwater is available as a substitute, while Keplinger et al. (1998) focus on quantitative 
restrictions on groundwater use. Furthermore, using a dynamic simulation, Iglesias et al. 
(2003) show that prudent surface water allocations during non-drought years can limit the 
negative impacts of water quantity restrictions upon farmers during periods of drought. 
 
Despite this burgeoning literature, one dimension of farmers' responses that is frequently 
overlooked in the evaluation of water conservation policies is farmers' preference for risk. 
This is likely to be a serious omission since, not only is uncertainty almost ubiquitous for 
farmers, e.g. due to climatic variability and the prospect of drought, but production theory and 
empirical evidence shows clearly that farmers' preferences for risk are of considerable 
moment in determining their production decisions (e.g. Leathers and Quiggin 1991, Wik et al. 
2004, Miyata 2003). Hence, to a large extent, risk preferences will determine responses to, 
and the welfare impacts of, water conservation policiesi.  
 
Unfortunately, the empirical problems associated with incorporating risk in production 
analysis are numerous. Early empirical studies made implicit, if not explicit assumptions 
regarding the effect of inputs on production riskii. The multiplicative stochastic specifications 
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employed disallowed inputs that marginally reduce risk. Such models are clearly at odds with 
the risk-reducing nature of some inputs and the observation that risk averse farmers configure 
their inputs to hedge against production risk in line with their risk preferences. As an initial 
response, Just and Pope (1978, 1979) (JP) proposed a more general stochastic specification 
for the production function allowing risk-increasing or risk-decreasing inputs. However, Antle 
(1983, 1987) showed that JP restricts the effects of inputs across higher order moments in 
exactly the way traditional econometric models do across all moments. Antle’s ‘moment-
based approach’ identified a set of general conditions under which standard econometric 
techniques can be used to identify agricultural technology without imposing such arbitrary 
restrictions on inputs.  
 
One further advantage of Antle’s method is that, while later contributions (e.g. Love and 
Buccola, 1991, 1999) could not escape making implicit assumptions about the form of 
farmers’ utility functionsiii, Antle (1987), and more recently Kumbhakar (2002), also provides 
a flexible approach to the estimation of risk preferences. In each case risk preferences are 
estimated as part of a structural econometric model in which neither the impact of inputs on 
risk nor the form of the utility function is restricted. These qualities make the approach ideally 
suited to analyse responses to interventions in uncertain environments.  
 
In the light of this discussion, the objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly, we wish to 
understand precisely how farmers' decisions are influenced by their risk preferences. 
Secondly, we wish to establish the importance of considering risk preferences in the ex ante 
evaluation of the welfare impacts of temporary water conservation policies. Such temporary 
restrictions are frequently implemented in response to severe and unexpected drought and are 
commonplace in irrigation water management in general (Iglesias et al. 2003). Less common 
however, is any analysis either of how preferences over higher order moments of profit 
determine farmers’ responses or, more importantly, the potential costs of ignoring these 
determinants in the evaluation process.  
 
We use production data from the Kiti region of Cyprus. Kiti is representative of arid and 
semi-arid agricultural regions in that considerable climatic uncertainty prevails, while it 
reflects our policy interests in that water restrictions are employed periodically and at short 
notice here in response to drought episodes (Socratous, 2000; Koundouri, 2000). In meeting 
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4 
our first objective we employ Antle's (1983, 1987) moment based approach to flexibly 
estimate agricultural technology and risk preferences reflected by Arrow-Pratt and down-side 
measures, as well as risk premiums. Towards our second objective we use the empirical 
estimates to evaluate farmers’ responses to, and welfare impacts of, the imposition of an 
irrigation water quota. We contrast the evaluations of three hypothetical water managers that 
differ only in the extent to which they have information on farmers’ risk preferences. This 
analysis reveals how the determination of water restrictions, predicted input responses and the 
design of drought compensation policies, may differ in light of information about such 
preferences.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the Section 2, we present the underlying model of 
farmer behaviour under risk and discuss implications of risk aversion for simple conservation 
policies (irrigation water quota). The data are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
econometric analysis and results. Section 5 presents the policy analysis for our hypothetical 
water planners. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Farmer behaviour under risk: the response to water restrictions 
In this section we analyse the impact of drought management policy on the production 
decisions of a farmer in a risky environment. To fix ideas we assume that the source of 
production risk is climatic and that the drought management policy is a temporary restriction 
upon water use: a water quota. Given the temporary nature of the water quota, our focus here 
is on variable inputs in agricultural production, such as water, fertilizers, and labour, whose 
choice and mixture may be modified by the farmer in the short-run in order to hedge against 
production risk. Furthermore, given the temporary nature of the quota, land allocation 
decisions and their relationship with variable-input demand are not addressed here. I.e., land 
is assumed to be a fixed factor and does not respond to temporary drought management 
policies. This means that fixed cost and technology choice considerations are also outside the 
scope of this paper. We assume throughout that technology is fixed and known to the 
environmental regulator. As for prices, we make the assumption that farmers are price-takers, 
so that a modification in their input allocation decision following, e.g., the implementation of 
the water quota, will affect neither output nor input prices. Finally prices are perfectly 
predictable in the short-run, so that they are considered non-random by the farmeriv. 
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Assume the environmental agency selects a value for the water quota in order to maximize a 
social welfare objective criterion including environmental considerations. Such welfare 
function would typically include the consumer surplus associated with the good produced, 
any environmental externalities related to natural resource depletion, and so on. An important 
aspect of our framework is that the quota is exogenous, so that once it is chosen, farmers 
decide on their production plans considering this quota as given. Both problems (choice of 
quota conservation policy and decision on the level of production) are thus completely 
separated. This can be thought of as a scenario in which the agency's environmental criterion 
is based upon the whole population of farmers, e.g. through some technological and 
preference representation, and each farmer is too small to influence the agency's decision. A 
key ingredient to assess accurately the performance of such conservation policy is naturally 
the sensitivity of producers to different values of the quota (the conservation policy 
instrument). This requires first, an adequate representation of the technology, but also of 
farmer preferences towards risk.  
 
The model of production 
In this section, the basic representative agent production model under risk is developed. 
As noted above, we assume an exogenously given quota whose determination is not detailed 
here. Let p  denote output price for a single crop, (.)f  is the production function, X is the K 
vector of inputs, and r is the corresponding vector of unit input prices. The environmental 
policy quota is directed towards a single input, irrigation water in our case, which is denoted 
wX  with associated unit price wr . We then have ),,...,,(' 121 wK XXXX −=X  and 
),,...,,(' 121 wK rrrr −=r . The restriction imposed on wX  is writtenv:  
 
ww XX ≤ .            [1] 
 
We assume that climatic risk affects crop yield through the variable ε , whose distribution 
(.)G  is not affected by farmer actions. In addition, to fix ideas we assume that prices p and r 
are non-random, so that ε  is the only source of production riskvi. Let us suppose further that 
(.)f  is continuous and twice differentiable. The agent’s problem is to maximize expected 
profit if she is risk-neutral, or to maximize the expected utility of profit if she is risk-averse, 
subject to condition [1]. In the latter case, the agent's problem is  
Page 5 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
6 
 
[ ] [ ] ),()( )'),((Max)(  E Max ww XXdGpfUU −+−= ∫ λεεπ XrXXX    [2] 
 
where U(.)  is the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function and λ  is the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with [1]. The optimal solution for element kX  would then depend upon ) ,( rp  and 
on the shape of functions (.)U , (.)f  and (.)G . The first-order condition for irrigation water 
input, wX , associated with this problem is: 
 
[ ] λε −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ′×∂
∂=′× U
X
fpUr
w
w
),(E E X  
 
( )
,
)'E(
),(,cov),()E( w
U
XfU
X
fE
p
Ur
w
w ∂∂′+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂=′+⇔ XX εελ      [3] 
 
because p  and the volumetric price of irrigation water, wr , are not random, and where 
ππ ∂∂=′ )(UU . It is apparent that the shape of the utility function (whose curvature is 
increasing with the degree of absolute risk aversion) will determine the magnitude of the 
departure from the risk-neutrality case. For a risk-neutral producer, the price ratio under the 
quota ( )[ ])E(1 Urp w ′+ λ  equals the expected marginal productivity of wX . When the 
producer is risk averse, the second term in the right-hand side of [3] is different from 0, and 
measures deviations from the risk-neutrality case. More precisely, this term is proportional 
and has the opposite sign, to the marginal risk premium. If irrigation water is risk increasing, 
the marginal risk premium increases with wX  and the desired level of that input decreases, all 
other things being equal. In principle, solving Equation [3] for wX  yields the equilibrium 
input quantity in terms of p , r, wX  and λ .  
 
This problem, however, is empirically difficult. In addition to the choice of technology 
specification, the distribution of ε  needs to be known and the agent’s preferences need to be 
specified. For this reason we choose a flexible estimation approach that has the advantage of 
requiring only cross-sectional information on prices and input quantities. The key feature of 
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7 
this approach is to note that the solution to the producer problem can be written as a function 
of input levels alone. More precisely, maximizing the expected utility of profit under the 
quota restriction with respect to any input, is equivalent to maximizing a function of moments 
of the distribution of ε , those moments having themselves X as an argument. There is no loss 
of generality here, because such a function of the moments, denoted (.)F , is completely 
unspecified. The farmer's problem becomes: 
 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,   subject to     ..., , ,)(  E Max 21 wwm XXFU ≤= XXXX µµµπ     [4] 
 
where ( )1 ,  2,  ...,jj E j mµ µ= Π − = , is the thm  moment of profit. 
 
Assessing risk attitudes: Antle's approach 
Based on the expression above, Antle (1983, 1987) proposes a moment-based 
approach to estimate risk-attitude parameters of a population of producers. Focusing on the 
population instead of focusing on each individual producer has two main advantages. It 
avoids any problem of aggregation of individuals and allows the identification of the risk-
attitude parameters from a cross-sectional dataset. However, this approach relies on some 
assumptions. First, the farmer solves a single-period maximisation program in which inputs 
are predetermined variables. Second, all farmers produce with similar technology. Below, this 
stochastic technology is represented by the corresponding distribution of profit, which 
amounts to assuming that the same profit distribution applies to each farm and that all farmers 
form the same expectations.  
 
Antle's method amounts to estimating the following K equations, which are derived from the 
first order condition for the kth input (k = 1, …, K) in matrix form: 
 
k
k
m
mk
k
k
k
kk
k
u
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X +∂
∂++∂
∂+∂
∂+=∂
∂ )()()()( 3
3
2
21
1 µθµθµθθµ "       [5] 
 
where jkθ  ),...,2( mj =  is equal to ( ) ( ))(/)(/)(/)(!1 1 XXXX µµ ∂∂∂∂×− FFj j ; that is, jkθ  
represents average population risk attitude parameter relating to the jth moment in the kth 
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8 
input’s first order condition. Hence for each input k , we have m unknown parameters, jkθ , 
and ku  is the usual econometric error term
vii. 
 
The analysis is made input by input to capture the possibility that each input contributes 
differently to the moments of the profit distribution. In general, we expect that all inputs 
increase the expected profit but, for the second-order moment, inputs can be risk-increasing or 
risk-decreasing. Equation [5] shows that the marginal contribution of input k  to the expected 
profit, given by kXX ∂∂ )(1µ , is written as a linear combination of the marginal contributions 
of input k  to the other moments (variance: kXX ∂∂ )(2µ , skewness: kXX ∂∂ )(3µ , ...). The 
most important feature of this model is that the parameters k2θ  and k3θ  are directly 
interpretable as Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk aversion coefficients, respectively. The 
Arrow-Pratt )(AP  absolute risk aversion coefficient is defined by: 
 
( )
( ) 21
2 2
)()(
)()(
)(
)( θµ
µ
π
π =∂∂
∂∂−≅′
′′−=
XXF
XXF
UE
UEAP  .      [6] 
 
A positive AP  coefficient means that the farmer is risk-averse. Down-side )(DS  risk 
aversion is measured by: 
 
( )
( ) .6)()(
)()(
)(
)(
3
1
3 θµ
µ
π
π −=∂∂
∂∂≅′
′′′=
XXF
XXF
UE
UEDS        [7] 
 
A positive DS  coefficient means that the farmer is averse to down-side risk, where 
downside-risk aversion can be thought of as a preference for disaster avoidanceviii.  It is 
important to notice that in [6] and [7] we have dropped the index k. This reflects that, contrary 
to Antle (1987), we take the view that it does not make sense to have input specific measures 
of risk aversion. Although each input can affect the moments of profit in different ways, the 
AP and DS coefficients are related to the preferences over the moments of profit, Π . For this 
reason, no matter what the effect of inputs on the moments of profit, the preferences over 
moments of profit should remain the same across inputs. Thus it should be the case that 
jjk θθ = , and hence APAPk =  and DSDSk = .  
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The AP  and DS  coefficients can then be used to compute the risk premium, denoted RP . 
Assuming that the farmer is concerned by the first three moments of the distribution only, we 
have 62 32 DSAPRP µµ −= , where 2µ  and 3µ  are respectively a measure of the second- 
and third-order moments of the distribution. 0>RP  means that the farmer is characterized by 
a positive willingness-to-pay to be insured against risk. Coefficients 2θ  and 3θ , directly 
related to AP  and DS , can also be interpreted as a measure of the marginal contribution of 
each moment to the risk premium. 
 
3. Dataset description 
Cyprus is representative of arid and semi-arid regions in general, typified by low and 
variable rainfall and overuse of groundwater resources. There are a wide variety of crops 
grown in Cyprus ranging from the permanent crops such as olives, citrus and other deciduous 
fruits and nuts, to more temporary cereal and vegetable crops. The Kiti region lies within the 
southerly Larnaca area of Government controlled Cyprus. To date over 2200ha of irrigation 
has been developed in the Larnaca area (MIT, 1999) and historically the Kiti region has been 
dependent upon groundwater to sustain irrigated agriculture.  
The farm level data is drawn from a survey of agricultural production of the coastal Kiti 
region of Cyprus undertaken by the University of Cyprus and the Ministry of Agriculture in 
the summer of 1998. A cross-section of 283 farmers was surveyed regarding production 
activities on representative parcels of their land. Information included expenditures upon, and 
quantities purchased of, fixed and variable inputs used in the production of final outputs. The 
total area of land owned by the farmer and the area(s) devoted to irrigated/non-irrigated and 
temporary/permanent crops were also provided. The survey data included climatic data in the 
form of rainfall measurements and soil quality characteristics for each parcel of land. 
Qualitative data was also provided, e.g. information regarding farm ownership, family 
characteristics and access to water resources. The total area of land cultivated by the farmers 
is 807ha of which approximately 42% is irrigated. The cross-section sample represents 
approximately 15% of the developed irrigated land in the Larnaca areaix. The wide variety of 
crop types represented in the sample necessitated the grouping of crops into broad categories 
to overcome the sparseness of individual crop observationsx. Crops have been grouped into 
two categories namely: vegetables and cerealsxi. Once grouped in this way, the data show that 
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10 
85% of the farmers grow a single crop. The data sample used is almost equally dominated by 
agricultural parcels, which cultivate vegetables (133 parcels) and cereals (135 parcels). 
Relatively few agricultural units choose to cultivate citrus (30 parcels). Moreover, on average 
more hectares per parcel of land are devoted to vegetables (2.87) and cereals (2.79) 
cultivations, than to citrus cultivations. While mean annual crop-specific gross revenues (total 
sales) per hectare of land are higher for vegetables than for cereals, vegetable cultivation 
involves higher mean input expenditure. The variability of expenditures among farmers is 
also higher for vegetables. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics by crop groups regarding 
surface, revenue and major input expenditures. We also report descriptive statistics for 
variables to be used as instruments in the econometric application: WELLON, a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if there is a well in the parcel and zero otherwise, DIST1: 
distance of the parcel to the nearest town (in km), DIST5: distance of the parcel to the nearest 
river (in km), RESERVOIR, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the farmer has 
access to a water reservoir and zero otherwise, LAND, a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the parcel belongs to an agricultural zone and zero otherwise. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Data on the quantities of water used in crop production were sparse. In response, information 
regarding water requirements for the specified crops were gathered from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Agricultural Research Institute, 1998) and were used to calculate theoretical 
water demands for the farms based on the areas of land devoted to particular crops. This 
information is used in the absence of specific data on irrigation water usexii.  Similarly, data 
regarding the cost of water were sparse. This necessitated the construction of a tariff for 
groundwater pumping costs based on hydrological information obtained from the Ministry of 
Agriculture in Nicosiaxiii. It is assumed here that farms are totally reliant on groundwater, an 
assumption again borne out by the data, which shows that 80% of the farmers use solely 
groundwater in this area. 
 
4. Econometric estimation and results 
Estimation 
Following Antle (1987), we propose to estimate the sample-average risk-attitude 
parameters. Given that 85% of the farmers grow a single crop, we distinguish between two 
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11 
groups of producers: producers of vegetables and cereals. We report the results for three 
important variable inputs: fertiliser (including manure), agricultural labour and water. For 
both groups, our estimation methodology is the following. First, we estimate the conditional 
expectation of profit using a quadratic functional form: total observed profit is regressed on 
all levels, squared and cross-products of input expendituresxiv. We choose a linear quadratic 
form because it is flexible in the sense of a second-order approximation of any unknown 
profit function (Kumbhakar and Tveterås, 2003). The residuals of the latter regression are 
then used to compute conditional higher moments (variance and skewness) and are regressed 
on all levels, squared and cross-products of input expendituresxv.  
 
Analytical expressions for derivatives of these moments with respect to each input are then 
computed. Finally, we use 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares) to estimate the system of 
equations [5] above for three inputs, water, labour and fertiliser. Instruments used were 
(WELLON, DIST1, DIST5 RESERVOIR, LAND), see above for a definition and Table 1 for 
summary statistics on these variables. These instruments are the same for each equation 
(fertiliser, water, labour), in the case of cereals as well as vegetables. 
 
However, as discussed in the previous section, contrary to the work of Antle (1987) and in 
line with economic theory, we restrict the coefficients upon the moments of profit to be equal 
across inputs, i.e. we estimate the system in [5] with the following restrictions: 22 ˆˆ θθ =k  and 
33
ˆˆ θθ =k , where k= fertiliser, labour, water. The estimated parameters are then used to recover 
the population average Arrow-Pratt )(AP  and down-side )(DS  risk aversion measures using 
the relationships in [6] and [7]: 2ˆ2θ≅AP  and 3ˆ6θ−≅DS . These estimates are finally used to 
compute the risk premium, RP, which is approximately equal to: 
 
DSAPRP 32 6
1
2
1 µµ −≅           [8] 
 
where 2µ  and 3µ  are as before: measures of the second and third moments of profit. The 
estimation is undertaken for two crop-groups: cereals and vegetables, and hence crop specific 
risk aversion parameters are estimated. This is not to say that risk aversion varies across crops 
for a given farmer, but rather to capture the observation made earlier that these crop groups 
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12 
are grown by different groups of farmers in our sample. Hence, the average risk aversion 
coefficients are likely to differ between crops. 
 
The results also allow us to estimate the elasticity of the various moments of profit with 
respect to inputs. This provides us with some indication of the extent to which inputs are risk 
increasing or decreasing in the production of each crop. In turn, in the following section this 
enables us to understand how restricted water allocations affect the welfare of risk averse 
farmers. The results of estimation procedure: the population average risk aversion parameters, 
test statistics and elasticities of profit moments are reported in Tables 2 and 3 below. 
 
Results 
The estimates in Table 2 show that the farmers in the Kiti area exhibit positive Arrow 
Pratt and downside risk aversion parameters. This indicates that on average cereal and 
vegetable farmers in the Kiti region of Cyprus have preferences over higher order moments of 
profit since they are averse to risk (profit variance) and down-side risk (profit skewness). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Furthermore it is interesting to note that the extent of risk aversion appears to be different for 
cereal farmers compared to vegetable farmers. This is indicated by the higher estimate for AP 
in the cereal group, while DS parameter is not significant in the latter but significant for 
vegetable farmers. The Wald test statistic for equality betw en AP and DS parameters across 
the two groups is equal to 264.98, with an associated p-value less than 0.0001. Hence, the 
hypothesis of similar risk preferences for cereal and vegetable producers is strongly rejected 
and the following two results are established: (a) cereal farmers are willing to give up more of 
their expected profit in order to receive a given level of profit in the future with certainty; (b) 
vegetable farmers are willing to pay more than cereal farmers in order to hedge against 
disastrous events. As already mentioned in the ‘Estimation’ sub-section of Section 4, these 
results indicate that these two crop groups are grown by different groups of farmers in our 
sample. Those farmers that grow cereals are hedging against the variability of their mean 
income, while those that grow vegetables are more sensitive to extreme events. Furthermore, 
the related risk premium (by unit of profit) associated to cereals is lower than its counterpart 
for the vegetable group. This could reflect a number of factors including self-selection of 
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13 
more risk averse farmers into the production of cereals, and more down-side risk averse 
farmers into the production of vegetables, on the basis of the associated distribution of profit. 
Such a configuration of risk preference might be explained by the fact that most cereal 
growers are full-time farmers, hence interested in sustaining a minimum income from 
farming, while most vegetable growers are part-time farmers, hence their mean income (from 
farming and non-farming activities) is significantly affected by changing weather conditions 
only in the occurrence of disastrous events. [Personal Communication: Prof. George 
Socratous, University of Cyprus]. It is more difficult to compare values of the relative risk 
premium on the basis of risk preferences alone, as the relative risk premia also depend on 
group-specific moments of the distribution of profit. 
 
Given that the estimated system of equations in [5] are derived from the first order conditions 
for expected profit maximisation, theory suggests that the origin of the estimated equation 
should be equal to zero for each input (Antle 1987). Estimates of the constant term that are 
different from zero can be interpreted as a deviation from profit maximising choice of the 
particular input. We see from Table 2 that the estimate of the constant term is always 
significant, albeit close to zero for labour and water inputs. This suggests that, given the 
marginal cost, water and labour are being used efficiently by farmers in this region. However, 
the same cannot be said for fertilisers where positive and significant estimates for the constant 
terms are recorded for both crops. This implies that fertiliser is being overused by farmers in 
the production of both crops.xvi 
 
The sensitivity of the moments of profit with respect to inputs are also of interest here. In 
general the three inputs have a positive impact upon expected profit, except fertiliser for 
cereals, but it is not significant (see Table 3). Only water and labour for vegetables are 
significant when explaining expected profit. Fertiliser is a variance increasing input in the 
production of both crops (although significantly so only for cereals) while water appears to be 
variance decreasing for vegetables but variance increasing for cereals. Labour is variance 
decreasing for both crop groups. These results concerning the variance of profit are consistent 
with the intuition (and earlier empirical work, see Antle 1987) that more labour generally 
helps reducing risk because problems associated with plant growth can be monitored more 
accurately, while overuse of fertiliser can increase production risk. Fertiliser and labour have 
a significant positive impact on profit skewness in the production of vegetables and cereals 
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14 
respectively. Table 3 shows clearly the benefits of employing the flexible approach of Antle 
in the estimation of agricultural production technology compared to that of, for example Just 
and Pope (1978, 1979). Whereas traditional estimation methods place constraints upon the 
impact of inputs on the moments of profit, the method employed here allows inputs to impact 
some moments of profit positively and others negatively. It seems clear that this is a more 
realistic representation of the production technology. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
5. Analysis of the impact of water quotas 
In this section we illustrate the importance of estimating farmers' risk preferences for 
the economic evaluation of a water management policy: an unanticipated, exogenous quantity 
restriction or water quota. Quantity restrictions such as this are common water management 
instruments especially in the face of severe periodic water shortages and drought (Iglesias et 
al., 2003; Garrido et al., 2002; Moore and Negri, 1992). Given that irrigation water is derived 
from groundwater, one might ask how this policy exercise of water quotas could effectively 
be carried out. The difficulty of establishing and monitoring quotas in the context of common-
pool groundwater extraction gives rise to the need for a tradable permit scheme (Provencher 
and Burt, 1993). In such a scheme, farms are granted an endowment of tradeable permits to 
the in situ groundwater stock, which they control over a specific time period. Each farm's 
bundle of permits represents its private stock of groundwater. This private stock declines due 
to groundwater pumping and increases to reflect the farm's share of periodic recharge. It also 
changes in response to the farm's activity in the market for groundwater stock permits, 
increasing when permits are purchased and decreasing when permits are sold. As a practical 
matter, the market price for permits serves to allocate groundwater over time. Our work in 
this paper indicates the importance of accounting for risk considerations when deciding the 
size of the endowment of tradable permits to the in situ groundwater stock. That is, this 
endowment should be a function, not only of the hydrogeological and climatic conditions that 
prevail in the region and farmers’ production technology, but also the risk preferences of 
these farmers, which will define the way they use inputs in order to hedge against production 
risk. 
 
Scenarios 
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15 
In order to illustrate our point we consider three scenarios, which differ only in the 
information assumed available to the policy maker regarding farmers' risk preferences. We 
then go on to show how the evaluation of the policy differs across scenarios. In particular we 
evaluate three important dimensions of farmers' responses to restrictions in a risk averse 
environment: input mix, the moments of profit and average risk premiums. We assume that 
land (and other factors) is fixed and hence the response evaluated represents either a short-run 
response to a once and for all quantity restriction or the response to a one off water restriction 
in the face of a periodic water shortage. 
 
In Scenario 1 we assume that the policy maker assesses the immediate impacts of the policy 
on the understanding that farmers are risk neutral and attempt to maximise expected profit. 
This represents perhaps the most usual way to handle conservation policies. In Scenarios 2 
and 3 we assume that the policy maker is less naïve about risk preferences. In Scenario 2 
farmers' preferences over the variance of profit are considered while in Scenario 3 it is 
assumed that preferences for both variance and skewness of profit are considered in 
evaluating the water management policy. That is, the policy maker considers both Arrow-
Pratt (AP) parameters in Scenario 2 and both AP and down-side risk (DS) aversion 
characteristics in Scenario 3. Scenario 3 allows us to illustrate the importance of preferences 
for higher order moments of profit in determining farmer responses. In evaluating the impact 
upon farmers of the water quota policy we calculate the elasticity with respect to water of the 
inputs to production for two crop groups: cereals and vegetables. 
 
Measurement of Farmer Responses 
Elasticities of inputs with respect to water are calculated from the system of first order 
conditions for expected profit maximisation, evaluated using the previously-obtained 
parameter estimates. Direct application of the general implicit function theorem yields: 
 
2 2 2
1 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 3
2 2 2
1 2 3
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 3
/ ( / 2) / ( / 6) /
/ ( / 2) / ( / 6) /
/ ( / 2) / ( / 6) / .
/ ( / 2) / ( / 6) /
F W AP F W DS F WF
W F AP F DS F
L W AP L W DS L WL
W L AP L DS L
µ µ µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ
µ µ µ
∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂∂ =∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂∂ =∂ ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂
    [9] 
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In Scenario 1 ('Risk Neutrality'), equation [9] is evaluated assuming that AP and DS are equal 
to zero. Scenario 2 ('No down-side Risk') assumes that only DS is equal to zero and employs 
the estimated values for AP, whilst Scenario 3 employs the estimates of both AP and DS 
reported in the previous section. Using the comparative statics in [9] means that in each case 
and for each crop, elasticities of fertiliser and labour are assessed after water use, fertiliser and 
labour have responded.xvii The results to this analysis are shown in Table 4. Note that, because 
the DS parameter is not significant for cereals, results are the same for Scenarios 2 and 3 
concerning this group. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The impacts of a water conservation policy can be interpreted as follows. In Scenario 1 the 
policy maker would expect cereal growers to increase fertiliser use by 0.29% and labour by 
0.60% in response to a 1% restriction in water use. Once AP characteristics are introduced in 
Scenario 2 the policy maker would expect a 0.52% increase for fertiliser and 0.22% for labour 
; the sophisticated policy maker who takes into account preferences for higher order moments 
of profit would expect the same input variations, as DS is not significant for cereals. These 
estimates are statistically significant predicted responses for risk neutrality regarding 
fertiliser, and full preferences regarding labour. The differences between the scenarios are 
clear. The naïve policy maker who assumes risk neutrality would underestimate (resp. 
overestimate) the response of farmers in choosing their substitute fertiliser (resp. labour) 
inputs. 
 
In the case of vegetables, the difference between the naïve and the sophisticated policy maker 
is even more pronounced. The naïve policy maker in Scenario 1 would expect a significant 
and negative response (-0.17%) in fertiliser applications, and a significant and positive 
response (0.38%) for labour by farmers. On the contrary, the sophisticated policy maker in 
Scenario 3 would expect a significant and positive response (0.11%) in fertilizer applications, 
and a significant and negative response (-0.33%) for labour by farmers. Clearly, the 
sophisticated policy maker sees that water and fertiliser (resp. labour) are substitute (resp. 
complementary) inputs in the production of vegetables, whereas the naïve policy maker of 
Scenario 1 would, if anything, expect these inputs to be complementary (resp. substitute). 
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This represents an important reflection of the importance of risk preferences in determining 
production decisions and evaluating policy responses. 
 
The substantive differences between the scenarios analysed here come from the fact that 
under risk-neutrality reallocation of inputs is only determined by technological constraints, 
whereas under risk-aversion farmers reallocate inputs by considering not only technological 
issues but also risk hedging. A policy maker that ignores the latter elements of farmer 
decision-making will obtain a limited and potentially false prediction of the impacts upon 
farmers of water management policies. In the results above this is reflected in the different 
signs for input responses and the welfare effects reflected in the risk premium. As a result 
water managers will come to erroneous conclusions with regard to the optimal response to 
drought on the one hand and the optimal package of assistance or compensation to farmers in 
the face of constraints on the other. More generally, policy makers may fail to correctly 
predict the external effects if they are naïve to risk preferences. It is easy to imagine a 
scenario in which water restrictions lead to an increase in e.g. pesticide and fertiliser use, 
which in turn leads to a decline in water quality, where a naïve policy maker would expect the 
opposite response. The results in Table 4 alert our attention to this possibility in the case of 
fertilisers in Cyprus. 
 
6. Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
This paper contributes to the analysis of drought management polices in irrigated agriculture 
by illustrating the importance of estimating the risk preferences in evaluating their impact. 
Using data from the arid Kiti region of Cyprus we first estimate farmers’ risk preferences 
using Antle’s (1987, 1983) flexible method of moments approach. This reveals sensitivity of 
preferences to variance and, importantly, higher order moments of profit. We then analyse a 
drought management policy commonly applied in irrigation: a water quota restriction, from 
the perspective of three hypothetical water policy-makers who differ only in their 
understanding of farmers’ risk preferences. We show that a naïve policy-maker, who believes 
farmers are risk neutral, can wrongly predict the direction of input responses and hence 
welfare changes by ignoring preferences over higher order moments of profit. This leads to 
the possibility of badly designed drought management policy: the quota restriction and/or 
compensation measures may be too lenient, severe or missing important dimensions such as 
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18 
insurance. Our analysis of a temporary water restriction represents the first step towards more 
comprehensive analyses of the response of risk averse farmers to water conservation policies. 
On the whole, this paper aims to draw policy-makers’ attention to the fact that although under 
risk-neutrality reallocation of inputs is only determined by technological constraints, under 
risk-aversion farmers reallocate inputs by considering not only technological issues but also 
risk hedging. Hence, in the face of resource scarcity and uncertain resource availability, 
policy makers should design conservation policies and packages of technical assistance or 
compensation to farmers, by taking into account the effects of the farmers’ risk preferences on 
production decisions. Ignoring these effects can lead to wrong evaluation of policy-responses. 
These results are relevant for the regulation of productive activities that are affected by 
exogenous stochastic events, in general. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by crop group 
 VEGETABLES CEREALS
 Mean St Dev. Mean St Dev.
     
Surface allocated 1 (ha) 2.87 5.79 2.79 4.11
Gross revenue/ha (CYP/year)2 2614.91 4079.79 628.33 1138.26
Fertiliser expenditures3 (CYP/ha/year) 201.53 395.50 85.43 274.56
Water expenditures (CYP/ha/year) 359.66 359.00 104.23 211.34
Labour expenditures (CYP/ha/year) 662.38 2147.58 589.35  2075.12
WELLON (1= well on parcel) 0.4592 0.5001 0.39 0.49
DIST1 (distance to nearest town, in km) 11.43 6.80 9.91 5.24
DIST5 (distance to nearest river, in km) 2.07 2.97 2.15 1.54
RESERVOIR (1= access to water reservoir) 0.2370 0.4268 0.1804 0.38
LAND (1= parcel belongs to agricultural zone) 0.7926 0.4069 0.8295 0.39
Number of observations 133 135 
l includes irrigated and not irrigated area.  
2 CYP: Cyprus pound (1 CYP was US$1.5 in 1998).  
3 including manure. 
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Table 2. Estimation results 
Parameter Cereals Vegetables 
F1θ  (fertiliser intercept) -0.0540*** (-3.48)
0.0619*** 
(31.63) 
W1θ  (water intercept) 0.0011*** 
(15.58)
0.0000*** 
(2.82) 
1Lθ  (labour intercept) 0.0035*** 
(8.58)
0.0011*** 
(9.52) 
AP 
0.3401** 
(2.61)
0.0726*** 
(2.97) 
DS 
-0.0884 
(-0.61)
0.2930*** 
(35.90) 
Observations 135 133 
Wald test for equality between AP and DS : 2 (2)χ = 264.98 (0.0000) 
Relative Risk Premium 
( /RP EΠ ) 
0.1708 0.2216 
 
Estimation method: 2SLS. Instruments used: (WELLON, DIST1, DIST5, RESERVOIR, 
LAND). t-ratio (Student) statistics are in parentheses, except p-value for the Wald test. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. AP and DS denote 
Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk coefficients respectively. 
 
Page 23 of 30
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
24 
 
Table 3. Sensitivity of the distribution of profit with respect to inputs 
 Cereals Vegetables 
Parameter Mean Std. Error Mean Std. Error
( )E F∂ Π ∂  -0.0344 0.0689 0.0493* 0.0278
( )E W∂ Π ∂  0.0035 0.0072 0.0002** 0.0001
( )E L∂ Π ∂  0.0180 0.0864 0.0021 0.0028
( )Var F∂ Π ∂  0.1293* 0.0687 0.1367 0.0969
( )Var W∂ Π ∂  0.0114 0.0301 -0.0004 0.0004
( )Var L∂ Π ∂  -0.0070 0.0113 -0.0015 0.0040
( )Sk F∂ Π ∂  -0.2788 0.2539 0.3547** 0.1546
( )Sk W∂ Π ∂  0.0335 0.0818 -0.0002 0.0008
( )Sk L∂ Π ∂  0.1864*** 0.0696 -0.0219 0.0437
Notes. Π  is profit, F, W and L are respectively fertiliser, water and labour inputs, Var and Sk 
denote the second moment (variance) and third moment (skewness), respectively. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
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Table 4. Water quota policy simulation - Input elasticities (for a 1% decrease in water use) 
Cereals - Elasticity of Fertiliser and Labour to Water 
 Fertiliser / Water Labour / Water
Risk Neutrality 
(AP=DS=0) 
0.2984*** (0.1016) 0.6018 (0.4262)
No down-side Risk 
(DS=0) 
0.5180 (0.3621) 0.2275*** (0.0749)
Full Risk Preferences  0.5180 (0.3621) 0.2275*** (0.0749)
 
Vegetables - Elasticity of Fertiliser and Labour to Water 
 Fertiliser / Water Labour / Water
Risk Neutrality 
(AP=DS=0) 
-0.1708*** (0.0434) 0.3812*** (0.0683)
No down-side Risk 
(DS=0) 
-0.7241*** (0.0442) 0.1101* (0.0645)
Full Risk Preferences  0.1093* (0.0641) -0.3374** (0.1696)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. Reported estimates correspond to a 1 percent decrease in the 
water input. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i Ozanne (1998) provides evidence of the importance of risk preferences for policy analysis in 
agriculture. 
ii Such an approach goes as far back as Stiglitz (1974). 
iii See for example, Pope (1982). 
iv This assumption is not critical as long as farmers are price-takers. Extending the model by 
allowing for price risk in addition to production risk, although feasible, would not bring about 
significant changes in the analysis. 
v wX  is either in absolute or relative terms. In the latter case, we would have for example 
0)1( ww XX δ−= , with 0wX  the reference water consumption, and δ  the desired rate of 
reduction in water use. 
vi With the multiplicative risk specification that we have here, ε  could also represent output 
price risk, p. However, we wish to focus on climate as the particular source of uncertainty. 
vii The inclusion of a constant term in the empirical model measures the extent to which the 
population exhibits profit maximising behaviour. Theory suggests that for profit maximising 
farmers this should be zero and hence in the results section we check this hypothesis for each 
model. 
viii Down-side risk is concerned with asymmetric (skewed) statistical distributions of profit 
and in particular aversion to disastrous events (see e.g., Menezes et al., 1980 for a discussion).  
ix A comparison to national statistics (see Agricultural Research Institute, 1998) reveals that 
the Kiti region provides a reasonable representation of the composition of crop production in 
Cyprus as a whole. 
x Major crops in the region are coriander and broad bean (respectively 13.5 % and 16.5 % of 
total area), barley and wheat (respectively 18.9 % and 14.6 % of total area). 
xi Citrus is also grown in the Kiti area however the data for this production were too sparse for 
the estimation of risk parameters. 
xii Water requirements range from 2200 m3/ha/year for broad bean, to 6800 m3/ha/year for 
okra. Concerning cereals, these requirements are respectively 5500 m3/ha/year for bran, 
barley and wheat, and 6500 m3/ha/year for corn. 
xiii Irrigation water costs depend on an area-specific pumping lift, ranging between 6.5 and 
18.5 meter. Marginal groundwater costs are estimated between 0.13 CYP/m3 and 0.37 
CYP/m3, depending on the area (Koundouri, 2000). 
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xiv All variables are rescaled by their standard deviation. 
xv The 4th moment, kurtosis, was also considered however, estimated coefficients were not 
significant. We concentrate on variance and skewness in order to illustrate the importance of 
higher order moments to farmers' decisions. 
xvi However, this could be some remnant of the composite nature of the fertilizer input. 
xvii Given our assumption that land (and other factors), output and input prices are assumed 
fixed, it is unrealistic to draw inferences from a simulation scenario that results in input values 
very far from reference values. Presumably, if the quota policy requires large variations in 
water use from the reference case, farmers are likely to react, not only by adjusting the levels 
of their other inputs, but also by curtailing production on certain areas of land, possibly also 
modifying prices.  
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Replies to the referee on « The story of the moment: risk averse Cypriot farmers 
respond to drought management » 
 
 
 
We wish to thank the referee for his relevant comments and useful suggestions. We explain 
below how we responded to each of the critics. 
 
 
Comments 1 and 2) Specification of the production function. 
The authors collectively agree with the referee’s critic about the omission of labour in the 
production function. We thus followed the referee’s suggestion by considering labour as an 
additional variable input in the production function, in addition to fertilizer and water. Land is 
still assumed to be a fixed factor. Basic statistics on the three variable inputs are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
Comment 3) Choice of the quadratic functional form. 
The quadratic functional form (which is commonly used in the estimation of agricultural 
profit functions) has been chosen because it is flexible in the sense of a second-order 
approximation of any unknown profit function (Kumbhakar and Tveterås, 2003). Although 
other flexible forms are considered in the literature, such as the Translog specification in 
particular, preliminary estimates revealed that the quadratic profit function performed better 
in terms of statistical fit on our sample. We justify our choice of a quadratic functional form, 
along these lines, in the revised version of the article (page 11).  
 
Comment 4) Choice of GMM as an estimation technique. 
Following the referee’s comment, we decided to estimate the model using a Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimation technique, instead of a GMM. The major difference in our (linear) 
case between 2SLS and GMM would be in terms of robustness with respect to error variance 
misspecification, the 2SLS estimator being however more efficient under the assumption of 
homoskedasticity. Instruments are: WELLON, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
there is a well in the parcel and zero otherwise, DIST1: distance of the parcel to the nearest 
town (in km), DIST5: distance of the parcel to the nearest river (in km), RESERVOIR, a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the farmer has access to a water reservoir and 
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zero otherwise, LAND, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the parcel belongs to 
an agricultural zone and zero otherwise. 
 
Comment 5) Definition of variables. 
In the revised version of the article, we define precisely all the variables, including 
instruments, and show corresponding descriptive statistics in Table 1. 
 
Comment 6) Better explain differences between results for vegetables and cereals. 
We describe the differences in terms of estimated risk aversion parameters (between the two 
groups of farmers) in greater details, and we provide some explanations for these differences. 
We argue that “such a configuration of risk preference might be explained by the fact that 
most cereal growers are full-time farmers, hence interested in sustaining a minimum income 
from farming, while most vegetable growers are part-time farmers, hence their mean income 
(from farming and non-farming activities) is significantly affected by changing weather 
conditions only in the occurrence of disastrous events. [Personal Communication: Prof. 
George Socratous, University of Cyprus].” This discussion is found on pages 12-13 in the 
revised version of the paper. 
 
Comment 7) Testing of underlying assumptions.  
The statistical significance of the risk parameters (Arrow-Pratt and Down-side risk 
parameters) is an indirect test of the following joint hypotheses: a) underlying production risk 
is affected by input choices by the farmer; b) producers care about production risk, i.e., they 
are not risk neutral. 
 
Comment 8) Conclusion. 
We have tried to add more elements in the conclusion, in particular to emphasize more the 
implications of our results for policy makers. We argue that, “on the whole, this paper aims to 
draw policy-makers’ attention to the fact that although under risk-neutrality reallocation of 
inputs is only determined by technological constraints, under risk-aversion farmers reallocate 
inputs by considering not only technological issues but also risk hedging. Hence, in the face 
of resource scarcity and uncertain resource availability, policy makers should design 
conservation policies and packages of technical assistance or compensation to farmers, by 
taking into account the effects of the farmers’ risk preferences on production decisions. 
Ignoring these effects can lead to wrong evaluation of policy-responses. These results are 
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relevant for the regulation of productive activities that are affected by exogenous stochastic 
events, in general.” This discussion can be found on pages 17-18 of the revised article. 
 
Comment 9) Presentation of the results in Table 2. 
We improved the presentation of the results in Table 2. In particular, in the revised version of 
the paper, we explain that the parameter 1kθ  is the intercept in the first order condition 
(derived from the maximisation of farmer’s expected utility of profit) for input k (k = 
fertilisers, water, labour). AP and DS, which represent the Arrow Pratt and down-side risk 
aversion parameters respectively, are now described in the note at the bottom of Table 2. The 
Hansen test no longer appears in the table, as we no longer use GMM (the Hansen test was 
used in the previous version of the paper, to test for the validity of the moment conditions). 
 
We believe that these revisions address the concerns expressed and the points of clarification; 
however, if you should require any further explanation from us with regard to these points, 
please do not hesitate to contact us. 
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